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Abstract 
Residential energy consumption is now an important component of total energy 
consumption and its related emissions.  In addition, this consumption has significant 
potential for growth in both developed and developing countries, as average incomes 
increase, and domestic appliance numbers rise.  Reduction in this energy use may be 
achieved both through conservation measures, and through increased efficiency in its 
use.  This paper focuses on energy efficiency in appliances – those many devices 
through which household energy is consumed.  The policy instruments available to 
promote the uptake of more efficient devices, and issues associated with their use, 
are reviewed, drawing on developed country experiences to date.  The instruments 
available are more limited than in other energy applications, and largely comprise 
information dissemination, forms of subsidy, and regulation.  The last is commonly 
used in the form of Minimum Energy Performance Standards.  Assessment of the 
three instrument types and issues with their use suggests that regulation is the most 
important measure – albeit with several qualifications on the manner of its use.  
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1. Introduction. 
In global efforts to reduce greenhouse emissions much attention has properly been 
given to large emission sources such as energy-intensive industry.  Other sectors 
however are of similar importance in emission terms.  In particular, emissions from 
residential energy consumption can be of the same order as those from industry [1].  
Residential energy use is important both for its present size and potential growth, 
and for the fact that it impacts directly on individuals in their daily lives.  It is this 
energy consumption, and the ways through which it may be reduced, which are the 
focus of this paper.   
The means of addressing residential energy emissions – the policy instruments - are 
necessarily different to those important in other sectors.  The objectives of this paper 
are to identify the scale and composition of residential energy consumption, assess 
the policy instruments available to address it and their relative effectiveness, and 
suggest ways in which they may be best used.  It uses as its basis developed country 
experiences to date, given both the association of appliance use with income, and the 
greater availability of appliance types in developed markets.  Discussion is centred 
around the role of appliances in domestic energy use.  For convenience, the term 
‘appliance’ is used here to describe all those numerous devices, large and small, 
through which energy is consumed in the production of various services to 
households.   
Reduction in consumption by such equipment may be driven by both efficiency 
improvements and conservation measures, the latter implying a lesser use of the 
service in question.  Besides implying different actions the two approaches differ in 
the policy measures which are relevant.  The focus here is on securing improvements 
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in efficiency and the ways by which that may be achieved.  The discussion considers 
particularly the role of regulation (in the form of Minimum Energy Performance 
Standards (MEPS)) as an active policy instrument. 
2. The Importance of Appliance Energy Use. 
Addressing appliance energy consumption is important both because of its present 
consumption and emissions, and also for its likely growth.  Household energy 
consumption (effectively representing appliance use in the most general sense) 
represents a significant portion of total energy consumption in developed countries.  
Importantly, as the major energy carrier is electricity with its associated emissions, 
households are a major greenhouse gas (GHG) source.  Domestic consumption’s 
share of national electricity consumption is of the same order as, and in some cases 
higher than, that of industry [2] – the more common target for greenhouse emission 
reduction initiatives.  Residential energy end-use emissions (that is, the total 
emissions arising from the use of domestic appliances) in the EU27 countries in 
2009 comprised 25% of total emissions – virtually the same as industry at 26% [1].  
Table 1 shows electricity consumption data for a range of OECD countries of 
different economic ‘size’ and income, the EU27, and a world average.  
 
The table shows the significant share of total electricity consumption going to 
domestic use, and the varying ratio between residential and industrial electricity use.  
It shows also the markedly varying electricity use per capita, and GDP per capita as a 
proxy for average income levels.  The latter is notable for the evident disparity 
between average world income, and that of the OECD countries shown.  That has 
important connotations for the potential growth of domestic energy consumption, as 
discussed below. 
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Table 1: Residential electricity consumption and income 
 Aust Canada NZ UK US EU27 World 
Residential use as 
% total 
23 26 28 29 31 24 27 
Residential as % 
of industry  
61 85 87 104 151 71 66 
Residential use, 
MWh/capita/yr 
2.77 4.84 2.98 1.93 4.54 1.64 2.48 
GDP/cap (2009)  $39,900 $38,100 $27,300 $34,200 $46,000 $31,900 $11,100 
Source: [2], [3]. 
 
The scale of residential consumption implies that it must be addressed as a part of 
any effective overall energy/emissions policy.  Appliance ownership is increasing in 
higher-income countries [4], particularly in consumer electronics and computing-
related equipment.  In addition, given the association of appliance ownership with 
income, GDP per capita increases in most developing countries will lead to further 
major growth in appliance utilisation – a point well highlighted by the difference 
between the OECD country incomes shown above, and world average income.  The 
scale of that potential growth is evident from examples such as China (of similar 
population to the OECD [3]) – whose electricity consumption per capita is currently 
less than 30% of the OECD average [5].  The US Energy Information Administration 
predicts that by 2015 non-OECD country residential energy use will exceed that of 
OECD countries [66].  Failure to deploy effective policy instruments will lead to 
significant emission increases from these sources. 
 
In terms of the contribution of the various appliance types, it is difficult to develop 
detailed comparative data because of differences in the categories and definitions 
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used by countries reporting data.  Illustrative data for five countries and the EU-27 
are given below in Table 2. 
 
Figure 1:  Components of residential electricity use (% of total) in selected countries 
 
Data for Australia Canada NZ UK US EU27 
Year/source 2006-7 / [6] 2004 / [7] 2005 / [8] 2005 / [ 9] 2008 / [10] 2007 / [11] 
 
Several issues are evident from Figure 1.  First, the data depict substantial 
differences in category energy consumption between the countries listed.  These 
differences are a product of 
- variation in national energy supply mix (e.g. New Zealand, unusually for a 
developed country, derives 38% of domestic heating from woody biomass 
[12]) 
- differences in national per capita energy consumption, and electrical energy 
consumption, as noted in Table 1 
- real differences in the relative use of individual appliance classes and, not 
least 
- likely definitional and methodological differences in category data reporting. 
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The differences in results between countries is worthy of study in its own right but is 
not developed further here, being noted primarily to indicate the range of potential 
consumption associated with the major appliance classes. 
 
Second, it is apparent that appliances fall into two groups – those few ‘thermal’ 
appliances of high power consumption (space heating and cooling, water heating and 
possibly refrigerator/freezers), and a larger number of appliances of individually 
smaller consumption.  The latter are numerous and increasing (in Australia for 
example from 52 per residence in 2000 to 67 in 2005 [4]), and the two groups quite 
different in nature.  Appliance purchasing decisions are likely to be made on 
different bases for the two groups, and this has implications for the policy 
instruments with which to address them, as discussed below. 
 
An increasingly important category of consumption not separately noted above but 
which is embedded in many devices is that of ‘standby’ consumption, the electricity 
consumption due to appliances in their idle state – that is, when they are not 
delivering the service for which they were designed.  The consumption level is 
typically low, but highly variable both between and within appliance types.  
Measured average standby power data for European devices showed CRT monitors, 
for example, to have nearly three times the standby power of LCD monitors.  As 
importantly, the ratio between the average standby power and that from the best 
available technology (BAT) was around 5:1 for LCD monitors, and 10:1 for CRT 
monitors.  While standby levels are relatively low (around 3W and 6W for the two 
monitor types), the total number of devices concerned is high and hence total 
consumption is also high.  The IEA compared standby power consumption survey 
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data between Japan and Australia in 2005.  Australia (which, as Table 1 shows, is not 
at the upper end of the household electricity consumption range) with an average of 
67 appliances per house, recorded average standby consumption of 807 kWh per 
year, or 10.7% of total household consumption.  Japan, with fewer appliances per 
house (28) recorded standby consumption of 308kWh per year, or some 7.3% of 
total household consumption [4].  In the US, with over 40 appliances per household, 
it was suggested that standby power could actually account for the majority of 
electricity consumed by some devices such as set-top boxes, audio equipment and 
video equipment [67].  
Within the overall set of appliances is one set of devices which well represent the 
difficulties of dealing with high-number, small consumption devices.  These are the 
ubiquitous external power supply packs for devices of all types from mobile phones 
to laptop computers.  In the 2009 US Residential Energy Consumption Survey, for 
example, nearly a third of households had at least four devices such as mobile 
phones plugged in and charging at home [66].  There are believed to be some 5.5 
billion of these devices in use in the world, consuming some 50 TWh per year, or 
around 1 – 1.5% of total residential electricity [4].  They are clearly a significant 
source of energy use which must be addressed, but – as with standby power - by 
means different to those of larger appliances. 
In summary, residential electricity use is significant in terms of national total 
consumption, and is highly dispersed – both over millions of individual households 
and within those, over a range of appliance types with significantly differing 
consumption levels.  It is not surprising therefore that addressing such consumption 
in policy terms has its own particular difficulties.  Before considering that however it 
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is useful to look briefly at the broad range of policy instruments available for related 
purposes, using the wider field of overall GHG emission reduction as an illustration. 
 
3. Policy Instruments 
Policy instruments are the tools that governments use to implement their policy 
objectives.  Available policy instruments vary widely in nature, and selection of the 
most appropriate instrument is a key factor in the achievement of those objectives – 
an aspect as true in the climate policy area as any other.  This is demonstrated by a 
broad literature in climate policy addressing instrument selection in diverse 
circumstances - for example in the promotion of wind power [13], supporting waste 
wood utilisation [14], and the selection of instruments to suit market segments [15], 
among many others.  The diversity of applications makes climate change and energy 
policy a fruitful field for such study.  This paper contributes to that by considering 
the very specific use of energy in domestic consumption, and the policy instruments 
most suited to reducing that consumption and its resultant emissions. 
In the broader field of energy/emission reduction there exists a wide range of 
instruments by which government may pursue their policy targets.  That however is 
not the case here.  For a number of reasons discussed below, the range of policy 
instruments which may be put to use in this area is notably more limited than 
elsewhere, and that in turn has implications for how the available instruments should 
be used.  The objective here is to assess the policy instruments associated with 
addressing such emission sources, their likely effectiveness, and what specific issues 
need to be addressed to ensure that effectiveness.  The following discussion briefly 
examines the range of policy instruments available and in use in the broad field of 
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emission reduction.  The instruments from that set which are relevant to appliance 
energy are then identified, together with the factors influencing their effectiveness in 
that application 
4. Policy Instruments for Climate Change 
 
The International Energy Agency [16], in its broad ‘Policies and Measures’ overview 
of member countries, identified instruments in use for emission reduction as 
generally falling into five types – three ‘policy families’, and two specific tools: 
1. policy processes (strategic planning, disseminating information, and 
consultation) 
2. fiscal instruments (incentives – tax/subsidy measures)) 
3. regulatory instruments 
4. voluntary agreements       and 
5. tradeable permit systems.   
Here, ‘policy processes’ are treated as being represented by information programs, as 
the active form of intervention in that group.  In addition to the basic instrument 
types, some practical instruments may combine elements to form hybrid instruments.  
Examples of individual instrument types, and certain issues with their use, are briefly 
reviewed below. 
 
4.1 Information Programs 
 
These initiatives seek to address one possible cause of market failure – a lack of 
information on the part of market participants, which prevents them from taking 
what should be rational economic decisions (‘rational’ being used here in the specific 
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economic sense of the “reasoned pursuit of self interest” [17]).  For example, 
producers may be unaware of potentially profitable means of reducing their energy 
consumption, or consumers unaware of the costs in operation of motor vehicles with 
differing fuel efficiency.  Providing information may enable both to identify means 
by which they may reduce energy consumption, and gain economically.  The UK 
Carbon Trust for example, like many such national agencies, works with industry 
through their Industrial Energy Efficiency Accelerator program, included in which is 
the provision of ‘best practice’ case studies in various industries [18].  At the 
individual consumer level, the Australian Government has since 2002 required new 
vehicle labeling showing fuel consumption and greenhouse emission rates, to 
facilitate car buyers making informed choices in their vehicle purchase [19].  For 
appliances, labeling is the most common information approach. 
Issues impacting on the effectiveness of information measures include the actual 
magnitude of the energy consumption being addressed, the nature of consumer 
response, and the ‘principal-agent problem’. 
 
4.1.1   Energy consumption: as noted above, appliances may be broadly divided into 
a few large energy consumers, and numerous smaller devices.  With the former, the 
lifecycle energy operating cost may well be such as to allow an economic case to be 
made for energy efficient devices, providing that prospective purchasers may be so 
persuaded.  Even where that is not the case, energy may well be a sufficient part of 
lifecycle cost that it is included in overall appliance assessment.  That is not so with 
all appliances.  Even amongst the larger of these, energy costs are not high.  The 
author’s own relatively recent washing machine and refrigerator for example would, 
under the specified operating cycles, consume around $A70 and $A98 per year in 
 10Revised submission version 010812 single 050203 
electricity costs respectively, using Australian Government label data and January 
2011 NSW electricity prices [20].  A 10% difference in those costs (as might for 
example arise through comparison between alternative brands) would therefore lead 
to cost impacts of around sixteen and nineteen cents per week, an amount most 
unlikely to materially affect consumer behaviour.  In marketers’ terms, the amount is 
unlikely to exceed the “just noticeable difference” between alternatives, and hence 
unlikely to influence consumer response [21]. 
 
As a purchasing decision determinant, energy consumption is even less significant 
when considered in the context of other performance parameters.  Particularly in the 
computer and consumer electronics sector, the purchase decision is more likely to be 
driven by aspects such as screen size and resolution, processor speed, or any of the 
myriad performance variables through which suppliers seek to differentiate their 
products.  That suggests that the value to be gained from labelling systems may be 
very limited if the information being presented is not among the principal selection 
criteria. 
 
4.1.2   Consumer response:  appliance labeling is premised on the assumption that 
making adequate information available to consumers should result in rational 
decisions in favour of more efficient appliances, where appropriate.  This is however 
difficult to objectively establish.  In its 2005 review of energy efficiency programs, 
the Australian Productivity Commission concluded “Appliance energy-performance 
labels have some influence on consumers after they have short-listed products on the 
basis of characteristics such as price, performance, capacity and style” [22] 
(emphasis added).  Tversky [23] described a very similar process in his ‘elimination 
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by aspects’ (EBA) model, an approach which might be used by consumers as an 
heuristic aid to simplifying decision-making in a situation of product selection. As 
noted in 4.1.1, such a process could well eliminate energy efficiency as a factor in 
selection unless it were considered to be a primary selection variable. 
 
In another observation, in the UK in 2006 following a detailed survey (including 
interviews with over one thousand consumers) Oxera (consulting for DEFRA) 
concluded “The most important finding is that future energy savings do not appear to 
be an important factor in a householder’s decision...to buy efficient appliances.....If 
the energy savings are considered as part of the decision at all, they feature only 
weakly” [24].  Were that to be the case generally, the value of labelling as a policy 
instrument in its own right would appear limited.  Considered in association with 
Section 4.1.1 above, it might be expected that this problem would be greatest among 
the smaller appliances, where even a clear knowledge of device energy would be 
unlikely to sway appliance selection founded on other more salient characteristics. 
 
4.1.3   The ‘principal-agent’ problem:  discussion thus far implicitly assumed that 
both benefits and costs of any appliance purchase will flow to the purchaser.  
Particularly in the case of the larger ‘thermal’ appliances that is not always so.  
Appliances such as hot water systems for example may be bought by owners of 
rental accommodation, or by property developers completing dwellings for sale.  In 
such cases while the purchaser will bear any additional cost incurred through the 
selection of higher efficiency appliances, they will not experience the subsequent 
benefits of reduced energy consumption.  This may lead to the broader economic 
‘principal-agent’ problem, a situation where one entity (the ‘agent’) acts on behalf of 
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another (the ‘principal’) but acts in a manner contrary to the principal’s interests 
[25].  It is often difficult for the future value of such savings to be embedded in 
either dwelling purchase cost, or rental.  Even where a premium to take such savings 
into account has been incorporated in rental, for example, it has been shown that 
tenants may act in a manner as to increase their energy consumption by an amount 
greater than the premium [26].   
 
4.2   Incentives 
 
Fiscal incentives may be positive or negative, in either making preferred goods and 
services cheaper, or others more expensive where a reduction in their consumption is 
sought.  A widely used positive incentive has been that used to subsidise renewable 
electricity development in various countries.  It is exemplified by the German Feed-
in Tariff (FIT), a measure requiring the purchase of renewable energy by distributors 
at specified (and hence to generators, guaranteed) prices [27].  A negative incentive 
may be seen in the UK fiscal measure which re-fashioned the annual road tax for 
cars in that country to make it dependent on the level of vehicle emissions [28].   
 
Negative incentives in the form of taxes on domestic electricity may impact on the 
larger appliances, but, as outlined above, are unlikely to affect smaller appliances.  
Taxes specifically targeted at domestic energy are also likely to be problematic 
politically.  Positive incentives through subsidies are hence more common, but may 
suffer from a ‘free rider’ problem.  This occurs where incentives are paid to those 
who would have bought efficient appliances in any case, thus increasing the cost to 
government of the incentive system [24].  In one notable study in Norway, 
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assessment of incentives for participation in an energy conservation program 
indicated that around 70% of those taking up the incentive would have undertaken 
the investment within two years in any case, without the incentive [29].  While 
careful policy design may seek to minimise the impact of free riders, it may in 
practice be very difficult to identify ex ante the likely takeup of an energy efficiency 
measure in the absence of a subsidy incentive. 
 
4.3   Regulation 
 
Pure regulation has not been common in emission reduction measures.  Where it has 
been used it has been both positively and negatively directed.  Negative regulation 
for example may be seen in the mandatory phasing out of incandescent light bulbs by 
the EU and Australia from 2008 forward [30], [31].  Positive regulation may be 
typified by Australia’s mandatory Renewable Energy Target (RET), requiring the 
purchase by electricity retailers of a certain quantity of renewable energy [32].  
Regulation may also be deployed as the setting of standards of performance, an 
increasingly important policy tool discussed further below. 
 
4.4   Voluntary Agreements 
 
Voluntary agreements (VAs) for emission reductions have seen wide use.  Japan’s 
emission reduction measures for example are heavily reliant on the VA undertaken 
between the government and industry sectors through Keidanren, the Japanese 
industry organisation [33].  Single sector VAs have also been used, as for example 
with steel plants in China, and industry sectors in The Netherlands [34].  While VAs 
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offer fewer difficulties in their introduction than do more coercive measures, 
questions have been raised as to their real effectiveness.  From a survey of actual 
national programs the OECD [35] concluded, in regard to VAs generally, that “the 
effectiveness of voluntary approaches is still questionable”.  VAs are arguably the 
second least coercive of the instruments available to government, (information 
provision being the least) although noted as often existing “under a shadow of 
regulation” [36]. 
 
Voluntary agreements are however not widely used in the appliance efficiency field.  
The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) database on policies and measures shows 
only several examples, impacting on issues such as incandescent light bulb phaseout 
in France, and standby power consumption reduction in Japan [37].  Both these are 
issues addressed by regulation elsewhere.  Voluntary agreements may play a role in 
the development of performance standards under regulation – but here it is regulation 
which is the operational instrument and provides the principal driver for efficiency 
improvement. 
 
4.5   Tradeable Permit/Emissions Trading Systems. 
 
Market based emissions trading systems (ETS) function to facilitate the reduction of 
emissions at lowest cost, and operate at various jurisdictional levels.  The Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative among ten US states for example is a cap-and-trade 
system which undertook its first permit auction in 2008 [38].  Nationally, New 
Zealand proclaimed its domestic ETS in 2008 with the major energy sectors being 
included from 2010 [39].  At the supranational level the European ETS has been the 
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‘flagship’ trading scheme since its inception in 2005 [40].  All such systems function 
on the basis of mandating a cap on emissions (a regulatory step), with participants in 
the market having the alternatives of buying emission credits to cover their excess 
emissions, reducing their emissions below their assigned limits and selling the 
resultant credits, or simply trading.   
 
A related form of tradeable permit/certificate system has relevance to certain 
appliances whose greenhouse gas emission reductions may be adequate to justify a 
permit system.  For example the Australian Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme 
is designed to induce the purchase of solar or air-source hot water systems through a 
tradeable certificate (Certified Emission Reduction) system.  In most cases in that 
scheme however the associated certificates are routinely taken into account by the 
equipment supplier [32], thereby appearing to the purchaser simply as a discount or 
purchase subsidy.  That reflects the fact that as the amount of energy saving which 
individuals might be able to trade is generally only modest, transaction costs for 
individual participation in such trading schemes are virtually prohibitive. 
 
4.5.1  Emissions Trading Systems and a Carbon Price. 
 
A consequence of implementing a broadly based emissions trading system across an 
economy is that a price is implicitly attached to any unit of carbon which contributes 
to GHG emissions, with that price flowing through the economy to services such as 
electricity.  The ETS thereby generates an incentive across the economy to reduce 
the consumption of energy services.  In principle, and with appropriate design, such 
a system should render unnecessary any other policy instrument for this purpose.  As 
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the Australian Government’s review of its Climate Change programs (the ‘Wilkins 
Review’) put it “[i]f there were a broad-based perfectly functioning emissions 
trading scheme in Australia, there would be no need for any complementary 
policies.” [41].  That review however recognised the need for a range of 
complementary measures, and focused on means of ensuring that policies were truly 
complementary. 
The International Energy Agency reached a similar view.  Taking as its starting point 
that energy efficiency should be at the core of the policy response to GHG 
emissions, it concluded that “..while carbon pricing is a prerequisite for least-cost 
carbon mitigation strategies, carbon pricing is not enough to overcome all the 
barriers to cost effective energy efficiency actions.” [42].  Those barriers included 
imperfect information, principal-agent problems, and behavioural failures, the latter 
being largely through the presence of bounded rationality (‘rationality’ in the 
definitional sense noted in Sect 4.1).  Gillingham et al [43] noted also the possibility 
of decision-making influences from prospect theory (where consumers value 
asymmetrically gains or losses of similar magnitude, potentially leading to 
conservatism in decisions) and the use of heuristics (various strategies adopted to 
simplify the cognitive task of decision making, even if at the cost of utility 
maximisation).  Tversky’s EBA model [23] noted in section 4.1.2 would be an 
example of such an heuristic. 
The discussion which follows proceeds on the basis that a simple ETS alone can not 
adequately address the available avenues for energy efficiency improvement in the 
appliance field and considers the instruments which might be used for that purpose. 
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5 Appliance Instruments in Use. 
Of the five instruments considered above two (voluntary agreements, and permit 
trading systems) are not considered of major value at the individual consumer level 
where purchase decisions on efficient appliances are made.  The sections following 
consider the remaining three types (information provision, regulation and incentives) 
with several examples of each.  For a wider range of example programs, and more 
detailed information, the IEA database Energy Efficiency – Policies and Measures 
[37] provides a valuable overview of international programs and instrument use.  
 
5.1  Information Systems (Labeling).  
 
Labeling systems are used for three distinct purposes – to indicate compliance with a 
set minimum performance standard, to provide comparative performance data with 
the objective of encouraging purchasers to favour more energy efficient models, or 
to indicate a product of superior performance.  One of the best known of the first 
type is the “CE mark” – an EU standard symbol indicating that the appliance has 
complied with relevant EU standards and hence may be placed on the market and 
move freely within the EU [44].  Such systems focus on compliance rather than 
relative performance, and hence are essentially adjuncts of minimum performance 
standard systems. 
 
The second type of label seeks to address market failure arising through ‘bounded 
rationality’, as noted in Section 4.1, which suggests that “[h]umans...must make 
inferences about unknown features of their world under constraints of limited time, 
knowledge, and computational capacities” [45].  Decisions are influenced by limited 
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information, the purchaser’s own capabilities and, as Goto et al [46] put it, the “cost 
of thinking”.  Label programs seeking to enhance a potential purchaser’s knowledge 
rely on an assumption of rationality – that presented with all relevant information, an 
individual will make choices which maximise personal benefit.   
 
Such labels may as a minimum seek to address an information deficiency concerning 
a product’s characteristics, or go further and provide some partly processed 
information (for example, the annual cost of operation) to simplify the purchaser’s 
decision-making task.  The Australian Energy Rating Label is an example of the 
former type, quoting for most appliances the electricity consumed per year in typical 
use [47].  The US EnergyGuide label is of the latter type, presenting the cost per year 
for typical use cycles and a standard electricity cost, in addition to basic electricity 
consumption [48].   
 
The third type of label seeks to impart some ‘premium’ value to an appliance by 
recognising superior performance.  The German ‘Blue Angel’ environmental 
labeling system awarded in 2009 its first energy efficiency-based labels for products 
such as netbooks and electric kettles.  The Blue Angel, founded in 1978, sees itself 
as “an ecological beacon showing the consumer the way to the ecologically superior 
product” [49].  The US ‘Energy Star’ label system has a similar objective.  It 
commenced in 1992 and coverage now extends beyond appliances, to new homes 
and commercial buildings, and the broad provision of advice and assistance on 
energy saving [50].  Similar systems operate in other countries, all sharing a 
common feature of identifying appliances of superior energy performance – and 
hence also targeting the ‘bounded rationality’ issue. 
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Labeling systems providing information still leave the purchasing decision with the 
consumer.  Another approach however limits consumer choice by precluding low-
efficiency products – through the application of Minimum Energy Performance 
Standards (MEPS).   
 
5.2   Regulation: Minimum Energy Performance Standards 
 
The concept of MEPS is essentially simple – to legally enforce performance 
standards on either an individual appliance or class basis.  In practice however, as 
with other policy instruments, it is the specific implementation details which 
determine the real impact of the measure.  Minimum performance standards vary in 
their application in a number of ways through 
- the intended effect of the standard  
- the manner in which the standard is determined 
- the method of measuring compliance and 
- the time frame allowed for compliance. 
 
The objective of MEPS systems is to reduce overall energy consumption in the 
delivery of the desired service from the appliance concerned.  If it is assumed that in 
most situations prior to the application of MEPS appliance efficiencies will vary over 
a range, then a reduction in overall consumption may be done in various ways by 
- simply removing from sale the least efficient devices 
- seeking to improve the efficiency throughout the range generally or 
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- pursuing the development of more efficient devices, with a specific focus on 
fostering development of new products of higher efficiency than those 
currently in the market. 
Each objective implies setting standards at different levels, and indeed may be 
applied consecutively.  For example initial standards may be set so as to exclude 
from sale the least efficient current appliances, with subsequent standard 
development seeking to raise class efficiency over the range.  In the first instance no 
product development is required to achieve an improved average efficiency; in the 
latter product development and innovation is required.   
 
Performance standards may also be determined based on broader practical and policy 
considerations.  Examples from the EU, US, and Japan illustrate the range of 
approaches adopted.  Arguably the most explicit measure in setting out its objective 
is the EU Directive 2009/125/EC [44], governing the minimum standards which 
individual appliances must meet to be eligible for sale in the EU.  Annex II of the 
directive specifies that “the level of energy efficiency or consumption must be set 
aiming at the life cycle cost minimum to end-users for representative product 
models, taking into account the consequences on other environmental aspects”, in a 
process using realistic product lifetimes, and discount rates from the European 
Central Bank.  Technical options for improvement must be identified through 
technical, environmental and economic analysis, taking account of economic 
viability and any significant performance loss.  The analysis must include also an 
assessment of the best performing products and technology, and both product 
performance and benchmarks from other national systems.   
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The US approach to standard setting is similar, while addressing a broader range of 
factors.  In an iterative process stakeholder views are sought, analysis (market, 
engineering and cost-benefit) undertaken, further consultation sought on preliminary 
results, and analyses repeated where necessary.  Factors statutorily required to be 
taken into account include, for any proposed standard, economic impacts, energy 
savings, any performance reduction, competition effects, and any other factors 
deemed relevant.  In addition, the standard setting process must result in levels 
which achieve the maximum improvement in energy efficiency which is technically 
possible and economically justified [51].   
 
Taking a different approach, the ‘Top Runner’ system adopted in Japan focuses more 
on demonstrated existing performance, with the identified ‘Top Runner’ products 
effectively setting a future benchmark for others.  In principle, the Top Runner 
concept implies that “energy conservation standards for electric appliances, etc. shall 
be set exactly the same as or higher than the best standard value of each product item 
currently available in the market” [52].  Thus as appliance designs evolve, the Top 
Runner approach provides an implicit driver to continually raise the level of 
performance in the product class overall.  In practice, while best current performance 
forms the basis of evaluation, allowance is also made for expected technological 
development, in extensive consultation with manufacturers and other stakeholders 
[53].  Published target years give manufacturers clarity as to required compliance.  
When measured, compliance is measured by manufacturer’s product class weighted 
average, against the set Top Runner standard [54].  Mechanisms (largely ‘name and 
shame’ approaches) exist to impose sanctions on manufacturers who do not meet 
specified requirements [53]. 
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A standard feature of the determination of MEPS levels has been the assessment of 
economic impacts.  Examples may be seen from the US [68], the EU [69] and 
Australia [70] – all regulatory impact assessment statements or their functional 
equivalents.  Such measures help to ensure that the use of regulation does not impose 
negative impacts in its pursuit of environmental effectiveness – a necessary factor if 
the potential disadvantage of regulation in the form of MEPS is to be avoided. 
 
5.3  Incentives - fiscal and subsidy instruments 
 
Labeling systems seek to encourage consumer decisions in favour of energy efficient 
purchases by capitalising either on consumers’ economic rationality (in showing the 
economic benefit to consumers of energy efficiency) or consumers’ preparedness to 
contribute to the common good (by demonstrating the environmental advantage of 
their purchase).  Minimum energy performance requirements on the other hand 
essentially preempt consumer preference, by limiting consumer choice to products of 
a certain minimum performance level.  The third major approach relies on modifying 
the price set within which consumers make decisions, to make more attractive the 
purchase of the higher energy efficiency products.  These incentives may be 
generated in a variety of ways including direct payments to purchasers, and tax 
credits or rebates. 
 
A variety of mechanisms of differing detail may be used to deliver an incentive to 
purchase.  Comparisons between these are not discussed here, as the objective is to 
consider differences between broad classes of policy instruments.  The use of 
subsidies to pursue energy efficiency however has been relatively widespread.  The 
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World Energy Council, considering 78 countries, separately lists incentives provided 
for appliances, lamps and water heating.  Table 3 shows the number of countries in 
which incentives have been provided [55]. 
 
Table 3:  Number of Countries Offering Incentives in Different Classes 
 
 Appliances Lamps Water Heaters 
Subsidy 11 15 22 
Tax benefits 4 5 5 
 
Data from [55] 
While significant, the number of countries using incentives is still much lower than 
those employing minimum performance standards for major appliances.  The same 
WEC database for example shows 63 countries using MEPS for refrigerators, 56 for 
washing machines, and 40 for air conditioners [55]. 
 
In addition to those listed, other measures have been put in place as a result of the 
2007 global economic crisis.  Governments deployed energy efficiency funding as 
part of explicit stimulus measures in Italy for example [37] and in the US through 
funding from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 [56].  These 
will not be further considered here, as the reasons for their deployment are only 
secondarily those of energy efficiency.  However they do serve to demonstrate 
recognition that such expenditures may be closely targeted, and relatively effective 
and rapid in their response. 
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6 Ranking Policy Instruments for Appliance Energy 
 
The practical set of policy instruments available and in use to address the significant 
energy use (and hence emissions) associated with appliances comprises 
- information provision 
- incentives in the form of subsidies of various types and 
- regulation in the form of product performance requirements (MEPS). 
Various criteria have been used to evaluate and rank the different types of 
instruments.  One such set suggested by the OECD [57] includes 
• environmental effectiveness 
• economic efficiency 
• impact on competitiveness 
• feasibility of implementation 
• stimulation of long-term technological innovation   and 
• any “softer” measures of success, such as increased awareness or engagement 
generated by use of the instrument.  
Of these factors, those most relevant to the instruments and objective considered 
here are environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, and, related to that, 
stimulation of innovation.  Other factors listed, while important, are much less likely 
to provide major points of difference between the three instrument types discussed. 
 
Environmental effectiveness:  information programs help promote energy efficiency 
but as discussed in Section 4.1 their effectiveness in influencing purchase decisions 
is questionable.  Subsidies are more likely to induce the uptake of efficient 
appliances, although their effect is less predictable than that of regulation.  MEPS, 
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enacted in law, would be expected to be the instrument most capable of producing 
high and predictable increases in appliance efficiency - subject to adequate 
compliance monitoring.  
 
Economic efficiency – achieving the desired outcome at the lowest possible cost – is 
determined by both cost and goal achievement.  Information programs, while low in 
total cost, are also lower than subsidies and regulation in their achievement of 
environmental effectiveness.  They are likely overall to be less economically 
efficient than the alternatives, for an equivalent level of effectiveness.  Of those 
alternatives, subsidy programs can be handicapped by the presence of free riders.  
Subsidies to free-riders do not induce action - hence their cost reduces the economic 
efficiency of the overall measure.  In addition, subsidy provision appears most 
prevalent in devices of high energy usage such as water heaters [55] – applications 
where the greatest likelihood exists for a positive economic case even without 
subsidies.  The cost of regulation may be relatively low for government, but may be 
significant for firms’ compliance – and hence for consumers, firms being assumed 
here to be able to pass on their costs to those consumers.  Compliance cost is 
strongly affected by the efficiency level demanded, and the extent to which that 
raises appliance prices.  That in turn is influenced by whether redesign and 
innovation may be used to achieve lower product cost, a centrally important issue.  It 
is innovation and resulting technological change which may be harnessed to pursue 
higher energy efficiency, at constant or possibly lower product cost.  
 
Pickman [58], citing US manufacturing data, noted that innovation was an industry 
response to environmental regulation, albeit it might entail substitution from other 
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alternative innovation avenues.  From a broad survey of the empirical literature on 
environmental policy and technological change Vollebergh [59] similarly concluded 
that environmental policy initiatives had an impact on at least the direction of 
technological change, regardless of the type of instrument used.  He noted that 
particularly in the process emissions field, standards served to provide clear signals 
as to what attributes of processes were undesirable (and by inference, what were 
desirable).  As he put it “[s]tandard-driven technological change is directed by the 
physical signal given by the standard”.  In terms of appliances, energy efficiency as 
such is not a normal design criterion for manufacturers [60], in the absence of 
Vollebergh’s ‘signal’.  Where that signal is given (and that is most clearly through 
the definition of performance standards) innovation may work to offset the costs 
potentially arising from that increased efficiency.   
 
The phenomenon of appliance prices dropping after performance-improving 
regulation was introduced has been noted in a number of cases.  Greening et al [61] 
assessed the case of refrigerator/freezer price movements in the US after 
performance standards were introduced in 1990 and 1993.  They concluded that the 
higher efficiency of new models did not lead to an increase in ‘quality-adjusted’ 
prices, which had indeed continued to decrease in line with historical trends.  Dale et 
al [65] identified similar results over a range of products, attributing the 
improvements in price to factors including product innovation, reduced markups, and 
economies of scale in the production of higher-efficiency units.  In the UK, 
introduction of performance standards (again of refrigerator/freezers) in 1999 
occurred at the same time as a significant drop in product prices, attributed in part to 
increased competition among wholesalers [60].  Using an experience curve approach 
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on three ‘wet’ appliances, Weiss et al [62] identified “a robust long-term decline in 
both specific price and specific energy consumption of large appliances”.  Clearly 
price movements resulting from mandated efficiency increases will depend on the 
circumstances of individual cases.  As a minimum, however, it can be said that 
higher prices do not automatically follow from higher efficiency performance; and 
more, that innovation, among other factors, offers the potential for real cost 
reduction.   
 
A notable area in which a performance standard has been promoted as a policy 
instrument internationally is that of standby power, discussed in Section 2.  The 
International Energy Agency has coordinated an approach premised on a target of 
one watt standby power for all devices, and a number of countries have commenced 
regulatory steps in that regard [63].  Standby power is an area of significant potential 
and one for which the approach of performance standards is well suited and indeed 
the likely most practical solution.  
 
6.1 Preferred alternatives. 
 
The preceding discussion suggests there is a valid and justifiable role for regulation 
(through Minimum Energy Performance Standards) in increasing the efficiency of 
appliances, and reducing emissions caused by their use.  There are arguments 
however against regulation – some ideological, and others practical.  Stavins [64] for 
example pointed out that regulation in the form of standards may not provide the 
incentive for ongoing improvement that is found in, for example, taxes.  That 
suggests that regulation should not be used where alternatives of similar efficacy are 
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available, and also that where used, care should be taken to minimise any 
disadvantage of regulation. 
 
In Section 2 above it was noted that the appliance family fell reasonably naturally 
into two components – one group, few in number and of significant individual 
energy consumption, and the other a much larger group with individually smaller 
consumption levels.  The former group offers the possibility of some economic 
rationale in the choice of energy efficient appliances; the latter group in most cases 
does not.  This division forms a logical basis to determine the use of regulation, with 
the latter being the appropriate group for which regulation (performance standards) 
should be the principal instrument to drive change.  In the former group, the 
existence of some economic benefit should be used as the basis to promote change – 
suggesting a role for labeling and information dissemination, with incentives only 
being used where there is inadequate economic incentive without subsidy. 
 
At the same time however, where regulatory assessment measures indicate no 
consumer disadvantage, it is reasonable that MEPS be used to ensure minimum 
performance for the environmental gains which that ensures, while retaining 
consumer choice among the complying appliances.  As noted in Section 5.3 above, 
that approach has been adopted with larger appliances in many countries to date. 
 
As a second issue, it is argued here also that where regulation is used, it should be 
regulation of a dynamic nature to provide the ongoing incentive for improvement 
claimed for tax-based instruments.  The nearest such measure in current practice is 
the Japanese Top Runner approach [52], premised on two major bases – the adoption 
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of current best performance as the criterion for the future, and a visible and 
predictable process of standard raising over time.  In addition, its use of a class 
average approach to compliance allows the retention of lower efficiency appliances, 
providing their performance is compensated by other products.  That in turn 
minimises disadvantage to those consumers for whom higher efficiency devices 
cannot be justified – for example, those intended for extremely intermittent use. 
 
The role of labeling and information provision clearly differs between the two 
groups noted above.  Where there is material economic benefit to consumers in large 
appliances of higher efficiency, the role of labeling should be to identify such 
advantage and promote it to consumers.  As a second role, ‘premium’ labeling 
systems such as the Blue Angel system should continue to identify superior products 
to promote their use.  For those appliances of lower energy consumption, the role of 
labeling is primarily to confirm compliance with standards – although there is value 
in labeling systems demonstrating the benefits of standards, to promote public 
support for such systems.  That in turn may make the political task of standard 
setting more broadly feasible. 
 
A final issue in terms of choice between the three policy instruments considered here 
lies in the potential for regulatory measures to address matters not able to be 
addressed by other means – as for example where more than one aspect of 
performance needs be addressed.  This is illustrated by the case of standby power 
consumption, that potentially substantial energy use which goes on when the 
appliance concerned is not delivering its service.  The problem which arises in 
addressing this consumption is that there is not necessarily a correlation between 
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overall appliance efficiency, and the level of standby power.  Hence performance-
based labels which are based on one variable only may give entirely the wrong signal 
to consumers in terms of another variable.  Regulation however, providing it is 
consistent, can separately address the two variables in parallel – a useful feature 




The analysis above reveals three main issues most relevant to appliance efficiency 
arising from the application of the three instruments information provision, 
incentives and regulation: 
- the nature of the two groups into which appliances generally fall, and the 
effect of that on instrument suitability 
- the multiple roles played by two of the instruments and 
- the relative importance of the instruments as drivers for change, and any 
conditions on their use 
The two groups of appliances included a set of only three larger appliances of 
significant energy consumption – space heating and cooling systems, water heating 
systems, and perhaps refrigerator/freezers, and a numerically far larger set of devices 
each of far lower unit energy consumption than the first set.  Because of both their 
higher energy consumption, and also their higher cost, those of the first set are more 
likely to receive in-depth assessment in their purchase – with that assessment likely 
to include the magnitude of energy use as a variable.  For that reason, the first set of 
appliances offers a greater possibility for higher energy efficiency to be a positive 
influence in the purchase decision.  In turn that suggests that information provision 
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through labeling and other means may be of value, and also that subsidies carefully 
designed to produce the minimum necessary economic case for purchase may be 
effective.  Because of the gains to be made from improving the energy consumption 
of this group, performance standards are also commonly used, because of their 
effectiveness, to exclude low-efficiency appliances. 
 
The second group of appliances appears likely to be little affected by subsidies 
(given a low energy component of total cost), and also to be little affected directly by 
labeling programs, in the presence of competing performance parameters influencing 
consumer choice.  Achieving efficiency improvement in this group must largely rely 
on regulation in the form of performance standards to address the supply side, rather 
than the demand side of the market.  Where performance standards for the first set 
simply define a base level, those for the second set effectively are the principal 
motivators for improvement. 
Regulation in this manner plays a different role with the two groups of appliances – 
defining a minimum acceptable performance in one, and in the other likely to be the 
principal determinant of outcomes.  A second instrument - information provision - 
also has multiple functions.  In the case of the first set of appliances, the role of 
information provision is to the extent possible to influence consumers’ actions by 
informing them of potential gains.  While there is an element of persuasion in 
influencing attitudes, it is the informational role which is most relevant.  With the 
second set of appliances, the role of information provision is to identify the 
necessary compliance with defined standards – but also to aid acceptance of those 
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standards by identifying the gains to be made through efficiency improvement.  It is 
regulation in this case which provides the necessary driver for improvement. 
That in turn suggests that with appliances overall, regulation in the form of minimum 
performance standards has a perhaps surprisingly high influence – in the 
determination of performance in the smaller appliance group, and in setting a 
baseline for larger appliances.  It has been argued here that to effectively utilise 
regulation in both these functions, the regulation process itself should be dynamic, 
employing progressive enhancement of standards of the type demonstrated by, for 
example, the Japanese Top Runner system.  That process would involve continuing 
and transparent standards development based on demonstrated performance, and be 
applied on a class compliance basis to preserve maximum choice for consumers, in 
the context of overall increases in appliance class efficiency.  Undertaken in this 
manner, regulation of appliance performance has a significant role to play in the 
reduction of domestic energy consumption.   
 
 33Revised submission version 010812 single 050203 
References 
1 EEA (European Environment Agency), 2011.  End-user GHG emissions from energy: 
Technical Report No 19/2011.  Accessed 21 Jan 2012 at http://www.eea.europa.eu/ 
publications/end-use-energy-emissions . 
2 IEA, 2010a.  IEA Statistics – Balances.  Accessed 21 Dec 2011 at 
http://www.iea.org/stats/prodresult.asp? PRODUCT=Balances   
3 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 2010.  The World Factbook -GDP per Capita (PPP).  
Accessed 16 February 2011 at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html?countryCode=# . 
4 IEA, 2009.  Gadgets and Gigawatts: Policies for Energy Efficient Electronics.  Accessed 29 
Nov 2010 at http://www.iea.org/w/bookshop/add.aspx?id=361 . 
5 IEA, 2010b Key World Energy Statistics 2010.  Accessed 12 Jan 2011 at  
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2010/key_stats_2010.pdf  . 
6 Sandu, S., Petchey, R., 2009.  End use energy intensity in the Australian economy - ABARE 
research report 09.17.  Accessed 12 Jan 2012 at 
http://adl.brs.gov.au/data/warehouse/pe_abarebrs99001674/energy_intensity.pdf  . 
7 NRCan (Natural Resources Canada), 2006.  Improving Energy Performance in Canada – 
Report to Parliament Under the Energy Efficiency Act For the Fiscal Year 2005-2006.  
Accessed 12 November 2010 at http://oee.nrcan.gc.ca/Publications/statistics/parliament05-
06/chapter3.cfm?attr=0 . 
8 Isaacs, N., Camilleri,M., French, L., Pollard, A., Saville-Smith, K., Fraser, R., Rossouw, P., 
and Jarrett, J., 2006.  Energy Use in New Zealand Households: BRANZ Study Report No 
SR 155. Accessed 24 Nov 2010at http://www.branz.co.nz/cms_display.php . 
9 Loveday, D. L., Bhamra T., Tang T., Haines, V.J.A, Holmes M.J., Green, R.J., 2008.  The 
energy and monetary implications of the ‘24/7’ ‘always on’ society.  Energy Policy, 36, 
4639–4645. 
10 EIA (Energy Information Administration), 2008.  U.S. Residential Electricity Consumption 
by End Use, 2008.  Accessed 29 Nov 2010 at 
http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=96&t=3 . 
11 JRC (Joint Research Centre of the European Commission), 2009.  News Release 30 
November: EU energy efficiency measures contribute to stabilise electricity consumption – 
drop in domestic use.  Accessed 30 Nov 2010 at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/jrc_ 
091130_newsrelease_electricity_en.pdf . 
12 MED (Ministry for Economic Development), 2010.  Energy Data File 2010.  Accessed 20 
Oct 2010 at http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/StandardSummary____15169.aspx . 
 34Revised submission version 010812 single 050203 
13 Enzensberger N., Wietschel, M., Rentz, O. Policy instruments fostering wind energy 
projects: a multi-perspective evaluation approach.  Energy Policy 30 793–801. 
14 Jehlickova, R., Morris, R., 2007.  Effectiveness of policy instruments for supporting the use 
of waste wood as a renewable energy resource in the Czech Republic.  Energy Policy, 35 
577–585. 
15 Egmon,C., Jonkers, R., Kok, G., 2006.  One size fits all?  Policy instruments should fit the 
segments of target groups.  Energy Policy 34 3464–3474. 
16 IEA (International Energy Agency), 2002.  Dealing With Climate Change: Policies and 
Measures in IEA Member Countries.  Accessed 27 Feb 2007 at 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2000/dealing2002.pdf  . 
17 Sen, Amartya. "rational behaviour." The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 
Second Edition. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008. 
18 Carbon Trust, (2010).  Energy Efficiency Accelerator.  Accessed 23 Nov 2010 at 
http://www.carbontrust.co.uk/emerging-technologies/current-focus-
areas/IEEA/Pages/industrial-energy-efficiency-accelerator.aspx . 
19 Real, J., (2010).  Reducing Vehicle Fuel Consumption and Emissions:  An Australian 
Government Perspective.  Accessed 23 November 2010 at http://www.mynrma.com.au/ 
cps/rde/xbcr/SID-EC0FAE80-4D184EAE/mynrma/Reducing-Vehicle-Fuel-Consumption-
and-Emissions-Jon_Real.PDF  




21 Britt, Steuart-Henderson and Victoria M Nelson. The Marketing Importance 
of the "Just Noticeable Difference". Business Horizons 38 - 40 August 1976. 
22 PC (Productivity Commission). 2005.  The Private Cost Effectiveness of Improving Energy 
Efficiency  Inquiry Report  No. 36.  Accessed 20 Jan 2012 at http:// 
www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/44622/energy.pdf . 
23 Tversky, Amos. Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice. Psychological Review 
1972: 79 (4) 281 – 299. 
24 Oxera, (2006).  Policies for Energy Efficiency in the Household Sector: Report prepared for 
DEFRA.  Accessed 2 February 2011 at http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/ 
what%20we%20do/supporting%20consumers/saving_energy/analysis/oxera-report.pdf . 
 35Revised submission version 010812 single 050203 
 
25 Satthaye, J., Murtishaw, S., 2006.  Quantifying the Effect of the Principal-Agent Problem on 
US Residential Energy Use.  Accessed  22 Feb 2011 at http://escholarship.org/ 
uc/item/6f14t11t;jsessionid=391F649371E35E8C7F3CFBFFC402AD0F#page-1 . 
26 Levinson, A., Niemann, S., 2004.  Energy use by apartment tenants when landlords pay for 
utilities.  Resource and Energy Economics, 26(1), 51-75. 
27 BMU (Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Reactor Safety), 1994.  First 
Report of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Pursuant to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (NC1) p 217. Accessed 20 Jan 2012 at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/gernc1.pdf . 
28 DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs), 2006.  Synthesis of Climate 
Change Policy Evaluations.  Accessed 02 Sep 2007at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment 
/climatechange/uk/ukccp/pdf /synthesisccpolicy-evaluations.pdf . 
29 Haugland, T., (1996).  Social Benefits of Financial Incentive Support in Energy 
Conservation Policy.  The Energy Journal 17(2) 79-102.  
30 EEP (Europe’s Energy Portal), (2010).  DG-TREN Memo/ 09/368: FAQ -  phasing out 
conventional incandescent bulbs.  Accessed 22 Nov 2010 at http://www.energy.eu/DG-
TREN-releases/MEMO-09-368_EN.pdf . 
31 DCCEE (Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency), 2010.  Lighting: Phase-out 
of inefficient incandescent light bulbs. Accessed 22 November 2010 at 
http://www.climatechange. gov.au/what-you-need-to-know/lighting.aspx .. 
32 ORER (Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator), 2010.  RET – The Basics.  Accessed 22 
November 2010 at http://www.orer.gov.au/publications/ret-overview.html . 
33 Keidanren, (2004).  The Formulation of the Keidanren Voluntary Action Plan on the 
Environment: History and Aims.  Accessed 23 Jan 2012 at http://www.keidanren.or.jp/ 
english/policy/2004/091/reference1.pdf . 
34 Price, L., Worrell E., Sinton, J., (2003).  Voluntary Agreements in the Industrial Sector in 
China.  Accessed 22 Nov 2010 at http://www.osti.gov/bridge/purl.cover.jsp; 
jsessionid=E41F859D25E432582C8E0E2FA36F9A80?purl=/825124-XicEYR/native/ . 
35 OECD, (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), 2003a.  Policies to 
Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Industry -Successful Approaches and Lessons 
Learned: Workshop Report.  Accessed 24 Jan 2012 at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/14/2956442.pdf . 
37 IEA, 2012. Energy Efficiency Policies and Measures Database,.  Accessed 23 Jan 2012 at 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/?mode=pm . 
 36Revised submission version 010812 single 050203 
 
38 Binder, J. A., 2008.  Climate Change and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.  Accessed 
23 Jan 2012 at http://www.bcnys.org/inside/env/2008/fallconf/ws6-binder.pdf . 
39 MfE (Ministry for the Environment), 2011.  Participating in the Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS).  Accessed 23 Jan 2012 at http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-
scheme/participating/index.html 230112  . 
40 EC (European Commission), 2010.  Emission Trading System (EU ETS).  Accessed 23 Nov 
2010 at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm .. 
41 Commonwealth of Australia. Strategic Review of Australian Government Climate 
Change Programs (Wilkins Review) 31 July 2008 2.  Accessed 06 June 2012 at 
http://www.finance.gov.au/publications/strategic-reviews/docs/Climate-Report.pdf 
42 IEA (International Energy Agency). Energy Efficiency Policy and Carbon Pricing, 2008.  
Accessed 06 June 2012 at 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/EE_Carbon_Pricing.pdf 
43 Gillingham, Kenneth, Richard G. Newell & Karen Palmer. Energy Efficiency 
Economics and Policy, NBER Working Paper 15031.  Accessed 06 June 2012 at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15031  
44 Europa, 2009.  Directive 2009/125/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
October 2009.  Accessed 12 Jan 2011 at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:285:0010:0035:en:PDF . 
44 Nilsson, M., Varnäs A., Kehler C., Siebert,L., Nilsson, J., Nykvist, B., Ericsson, K., 2009.  A 
European Eco-Efficiency Economy: Stockholm Environment Institute Project Report.  
Accessed 23 Jan 2012 at http://www.se2009.eu/polopoly_fs/1.6629!menu/standard/file/ 
A%20European%20Eco%20Efficient%20Economy.pdf  . 
45 CABC (Center for Adaptive Behaviour and Cognition), 2008.  Annual Report 2007-8.  
Accessed 13 Jan 2011 at http://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/en/forschung/abc/research-report-
2007-2008-abc.pdf . 
46 Goto, H., Goto, M., Sueyoshi, T., 2011.  Consumer choice on ecologically efficient water 
heaters: Marketing strategy and policy implications in Japan.  Energy Economics 33(2) 195-
208. 
47 DCCEE (Dept of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency), 2010b.  The Energy Label.  
Accessed 13 Jan 2011 at http://www.energyrating.gov.au/con3.html .. 
 37Revised submission version 010812 single 050203 
 
48 FTC (Federal Trade Commission), 2007.  The New EnergyGuide Label.  Accessed 13 Jan 
2011 at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/08/energy.shtm . 
49 Blue Angel, 2010.  The Blue Angel – Eco-Label with Brand Character.  Accessed 23 Jan 
2012 at http://www.blauer-engel.de/en/blauer_engel/index.php . 
50 Energy Star, 2012.  History of Energy Star.  Accessed 23 Jan 2012 at 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab_history . 
51 LBL (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory), nd.  The Standards Setting Process.  
Accessed 12 Jan 2011 at http://ees.ead.lbl.gov/node/2 . 
52 Wakuda, H., 2010.  Energy Efficiency Policies in Japan.  Accessed 13 Jan 2011 at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201009/20100917ATT82815/20100
917ATT82815EN.pdf  . 
53 Kimura, O., 2010.  Japanese Top Runner Standards for Energy Efficiency Standards.  
Accessed 23 Jan 2012 at http://www.climatepolicy.jp/thesis/pdf/09035dp.pdf . 
54 Nordqvist, J., 2006.  Evaluation of Japan’s Top Runner Programme Within the Framework 
of the Aid_EE Project.  Accessed 15 Jan 2010 at http://www.aid-
ee.org/documents/018TopRunner-Japan.PDF . 
55 WEC (World Energy Council), 2011.  Energy Efficiency Policies and Measures Database.  
Accessed 13 Jan 2011 at http://www.wec-policies.enerdata.eu/  
56 DoE (Department of Energy), 2011.  Rebates for Energy Star Appliances.  Accessed 31 Jan 
2011 at http://www.energysavers.gov/financial/70020.html . 
57 OECD 2003b.  Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Policy Effectiveness, Efficiency 
and Usage in Policy Mixes.  OECD Publishing, Paris 2003. 
58 Pickman, H. A., 1998.  The Effect of Environmental Regulation on Environmental 
Innovation.  Business Strategy and the Environment 7, 223–233 . 
59 Vollebergh, H., 2009.  Differential Impact of Environmental Policy Instruments on 
Technological Change: A Review of the Empirical Literature.  Accessed 2 Mar 2011 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/sd/conference/2009/papers/20/herman_vollebergh_-
_differential_impact.pdf . 
60 Boardman, B., 2004.  Achieving energy efficiency through product policy: the UK 
experience.  Environmental Science & Policy 7 165–176. 
61 Greening, L.A., Sanstad A.H., MacMahon, J.E., 1997.  Effects of Appliance Standards on 
Product Price and Attributes: An Hedonic Pricing Model.  Journal of Regulatory Economics 
11 181-194.  
 38Revised submission version 010812 single 050203 
 
62 Weiss, M., Patel M.K., Junginger, M., Blok, K., 2010.  Analyzing price and efficiency 
dynamics of large appliances with the experience curve approach.  Energy Policy 38, 770–
783. 
63 IEA, 2011.  Standby Power Use and the IEA “1-Watt Plan”.  Accessed 24 Jan 2012 at 
http://www.iea.org/subjectqueries/standby.asp  . 
64 Stavins, R.N., 2001.  Experience With Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments: 
Discussion Paper 01-58, Resources for the Future, Washington 2001.  Accessed 28 Feb 
2007 at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-01-58.pdf . 
65 Dale, L., Antinori C., McNeil M., McMahon J.E., Fujita K.S., 2009.   Retrospective 
evaluation of appliance price trends.  Energy Policy 37 597–605.  
66 U.S. Energy Information Administration.  International Energy Outlook 2011, September 
2011. Accessed 30 July 2012 at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/world.cfm 
67 Roth, Kurt, Kurtis McKenney and James Brodrick.  Small Devices, Big Loads. ASHRAE 
Journal, June 2008, 64-67. 
68 Koomey, Johnathon G., Susan A Mahler, Carrie A Webber and James E McMahon.  
Projected Regional Impacts of Appliance Efficiency Standards for the US Residential 
Sector, February 1998.  Accessed 1 August 2012 at 
http://enduse.lbl.gov/projects/standards.html 
69 European Commission.  Summary of the Impact Assessment.  Brussels, 2010.  Accessed 1 
August 2012 at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ia_carried_out/ 
docs/ia_2010/sec_2010_1353_en.pdf 
70 Government of Australia. Regulatory Impact Statement:  Proposal to Introduce a Minimum 




 39Revised submission version 010812 single 050203 
